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CONFUSION OF LAW AND EQUITY
By Henry H. Ingersoll, Dean of the Law Department, University
of Tennessee.
In last autumn number of the Juridical Review a distinguished
barrister maintains the thesis, that under the British Judicature
Acts, assuming to abolish all distinction between Law and Equity,
there has been, or will be, a fusion of Law and Equity, whenever
and wherever "justice is. administered by the courts without
specific reference to any distinction between Law and Equity."
Barrister Hogg admits that, although these acts are a genera-
tion old, no complete fusion has yet occurred except in a single
case, viz., Chapman v. Smethurst (I9O9), I K. B., 73, 927. In
the other cases named and referred to (and they are many), while
the Judicature Acts are recognized and enforced, and Equity
given the preference in power, there is express reference by the
courts to the existence of the two systems of jurisprudence and
allusion to the distinctions between these systems, so that no one
could prove by them that Law and Equity were fused.
The fusion of Law and Equity, so long hoped for by Hobbes
and his disciples in England, was the fond dream of Field and
his associate band of codifiers in America. And since there are
only seven States which preserve separate courts (Chancery) for
the administration of a separate system of Equity Jurisprudence,
it may be commonly thought that in America the dream and
prophecy of fusion of Law and Equity has been fulfilled.
This would specially be true in the "Code States," wherein, by
the Reformed Procedure, there has been not only proclamation
of the bans, but celebration of the nuptials between Law and
Equity, so that they are henceforth one flesh, if not one spirit.
To correct this common error is the object of this paper, and to
show how in America instead of a fusion we have achieved
hopeless Confusion of Law and Equity, which promises to be
permanent.
Back in Blackstone's time, before the various courts of Eng-
land had been all moulded by Act of Parliament into a single
"High Court of Justice," before legislation had corrected manifest
deficiencies of the Common law, and before the genius of Lord
Iansfield had opened the Law Courts to the gladsome light of
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Equity, the lines of jurisdiction between the rival courts of
Common Law and of Eqfiity were contentiously maintained, if
not distinctly marked; and, then, if ever, Equity was a system
of jurisprudence, rather than a collection of doctrines, topics and
remedies, diverse and unrelated, which it now appears to be in
many States, having only the nucleus of a common source-the
High Court of Chancery, which Lord Bacon declared "was or-
dained to supply the deficiencies of the Common Law," and Sir
Henry Maine happily regarded as "one of the agencies by which
law is brought into harmony with society." Harmony there may
be, but not by the fusion of Law and Equity. Detailed examina-
tion shall demonstrate the confusion. t
With reference to the relations of Law and Equity, and their
administration as parts of the American system of Jurisprudence,
it must be noted that the courts of the United States, both Fed-
eral and State, naturally separate themselves into three great
classes: (i) Courts of Law and Courts of Chancery in the same
States, having separate cognizance of cases of Law and cases of
Equity, and preserving substantialy the old lines of distinction
recognized and enforced a century ago in the English Court of
Common Pleas and the High Court of Chancery. (2) A single
court or system of courts, recognizing the distinctions between
Law and Equity, as two great concurrent systems of jurispru-
dence, and by means of separate dockets or separate sides, ad-
ministering both systems in separate cases, as is done in the Fed-
eral Courts. (3) The single system of courts of the Code States,
wherein all distructions between Law and Equity are abolished by
statute.
These are to be examined in their order to illustrate the in-
dividual distinctions within the several classes. And first of the
States with Separate Chancery Courts.
Before examining these States severally let us attend to some
general preliminary considerations.
Uniformity of Equity Jurisdiction does not exist in these
States, but rather diversity because of the diverse legislation and
judicial tendencies of their several assemblies and courts. Each
State has full authority to create its own courts and to prescribe
their jurisdiction. This power has been so freely exercised that
it can hardly be said that Equity Jurisdiction is identical in any
two States. Legislation may either contract or expand authority,
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and thereby materially change the Inherent Jurisdiction. In most
States both courses have been pursued, with the result that locally
-the original lines of this jurisdiction are obscured, and the
boundaries of the domain of Equity greatly changed, here drawn
in, and there set out, in whimsical diversity. For example, in
many States the inherent trust jurisdiction of Equity has been
-much restricted, by abolishing express trusts; and, generally, the
administration of estates of decedents and orphans has been trans-
ferred to Probate Courts; while in some States retaining the
system "of separate courts for Common Law and Equity, the
latter have been given jurisdiction of all cases arising ex con-
tractu.1 In most States Equity Jurisdiction is conferred by statute
in general terms ;2 in others, as in Maine, Massachusetts and Penn-
sylvania it seems to have been doled out grudgingly by piecemeal.
The abolition by statute of all forms of action and all distinction
between actions at Law and suits in Equity, effected in more
than half of the States, called "Code States," and the substitution
therein of "Reformed Procedure" has not operated to abolish
Equity Jurisprudence in these States. The general effect has
been rather to abolish law actions and retain equity procedure
and pleading without materially changing the doctrines and rules
of Law and Equity prevalent in the courts of England and Amer-
ica. Inasmuch as Equity Jurisdiction is the correlative of Com-
mon Law Jurisdiction-indeed, was formerly always asserted in
every bill by the formal statement that "your orator is without
remedy at law," 3 it is obvious that in most of the Code States this
topic is of no practical interest. Jurisdiction of any case in
Equity in these States does not-cannot depend upon absence of
remedy at Law. Demurrer cannot lie for lack of such allegation
or showing. If the plaintiff or petitioner shows by his petition a
case for redress or relief, either legal or equitable, or both, the
court in most of the Code States will entertain, hear and decide
his case, and give him judgment or decree according to the facts
of the case. The question in these States is the right to relief.
conceding that plaintiff is in the right court; for, since there is
but one Court for both Law and Equity, of course he can go to
no other; nor in the full Code States, can he alter his form of
action or change sides in the court. If he seeks what would be
equitable relief under the old practice, the questions he must
1 Tennessee Aets 1877, Ch. 97.
2Pomeroy Eq. Jur. § 285.
3Barton's Suit in.Equity, (Ingersoll) 57-102.
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meet belong not to Equity Jurisdiction, but to Equity Juris-
prudence.
New Jersey.-Most peculiar, and farthest removed from the
Code States in jurisdiction and procedure, are those States having
separate Chancery Courts and Chancellors to administer Equity
in them, as a distinct system of jurisprudence. There are seven
of them, naturally separable into two clusters, viz., Delaware,
New Jersey and Vermont, in the northeast, and Alabama,
Arkansas, Mississippi and Tennessee in the southwest. Of all
these States the New Jersey system most resembles the old Eng-
lish in the dignity and precedence accorded to its Chancellor, the
separate publication of its Law and Equity Reports, and in its
adherence to the pleading and practice of the High Court of
Chancery.' The Chancery Court of New Jersey, originally created
in 1705, by ordinance of the royal Governor, Lord Cornbury, was
revived and confirmed in 177o by ordinance of Governor Frank-
lin, and continued with unabated vigor and undiminished juris-
diction by the colonial constitution and legislation of 1776.2 The
original ordinance of Lord Cornbury empowered the "High
Court of Chancery in the province of New Jersey," to hear and
determine all causes and suits, brought in said Court * -- * in
such manner, and as near as may be according to the usage and
custom of the High Court of Chancery of the Kingdom of
England.3 The ordinances of Cornbury and Franklin made Lord
Bacon's ordinances the law of this court. And the Chancellor
has repeatedly declared in varied phrase, but always in the same
substance, that the English practice, when not altered by statute,
rule of court, or practice, is the law of this court.' In the Chan-
cery Court of New Jersey, then, as on the equity side of the
Federal Court, we have an American counterpart of the English
High' Court of Chancery. And the practice and jurisdiction of
the Court of Errors and Appeals in Chancery appeals is avowedly
in conformity with that of the House of Lords.'
Delaware.-The constitution of Delaware (1792) created the
Chancery Court of that State, and the office of Chancellor to hold
the same,0 and gave it, in addition to special jurisdiction con-
1 West v. Paige, 9 N. J., Eq. 203 (1852).
2 1g N. J. Eq. 577.
3 Id. 579.
4 Jones v. Davenport, 45 N. J. Eq. 77, 82.
5R. R. Co. v. Mayor, 23 N. J. Eq. 516-17.
6 Const. Art. VI. § 3.
YALE LAW JOURNAL
ferred by statute, -"the general powers of the Court of Chan-
cery," until otherwise provided by the legislature.' This power of
linmitation the legislature has exercised to the same extent as
Congress by forbidding the Chancellor "to determine any mat-
ter, wherein sufficient remedy may be had by Common Law or
statute before any other court or tribunal of the State."'
Vervtont.--In this State the judges of the Supreme Court are
by statute created Chancellors, and authorized to administer
Equity, and when sitting in Chancery "their powers and jurisdic-
tion are co-extensive with the powers and jurisdiction of the
Court of Chancery in England with the exceptions, additions and
limitations created and imposed by the constitution and laws of
the State."9 Whether the State properly falls in class one or two
may be doubtful.
The Southwestern States.-The jurisdiction procedure and or-
ganization of the Chancery Courts of Tennessee, Alabama, Mis-
sissippi and Arkansas (recently established), though not identical,
have family likeness and may all be treated together: They are
held by Chancellors, and possess the usual power to grant relief
in all civil cases in which a plain and adequate remedy may not
be had in other judicial tribunals, including those wherein extraor-
dinary process is necessary, and generally in all cases of an
-equitable natur. 10 They may grant divorce and alimony, allot
dower, and exercise jurisdiction in all cases involving the separate
estates of married women, the estates of other persons vion sui[
juris, and in other matters specially provided for by statute. In
Alabama the Chancery Court has also jurisdiction, in cases
founded on a gambling consideration; in Mississippi of adminis-
tration of minors' estates and of all matters testamentary; while
in Tennessee the jurisdiction of Courts of Chancery has been
extended by statute to all cases arising ex contractit. In general,
it may be said, the powers and jurisdiction of the Courts of
Chancery in these States have been more altered (usually ex-
tended) by statute than in the northeastern States. But this is
also true of the powers, remedies and jurisdiction of the Courts
7Id. § 13.
s Rev. Stats. Cr. 95, § I.
9 Rev. Laws, i i8o, § 698.
10 Ala. Rev. Code (1886) §§720-1; Ark. Kirby's Dig. Title Chancery
Courts; Miss. Rev. Code (iQ°o) § 182o; Tenn. Const. Art. VI, § Y. Code
1858, §§ 4279-8o.
CONFUSION OF LAW AND EQUITY
of Law, with the result that there is a broader zone of concurrent
jurisdiction in these States, and the lines of jurisdiction are not so
sharply drawn as in the East."
Law and Equity Distinct In Single Court.
The Federal Courts are the leaders in this class. The compre-
hensive provision of the Federal Constitution is that the judicial
power of the United States "shall extend to all cases in Law and
Equity arising under this Constitution." This double judicial
power is "vested in one Supreme Court and in such inferior
courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and estab-
lish." Whether the congress under this delegation of plenary
authority might have ordained and established separate courts of
Law and Equity is not now a profitable inquiry. The inferior
courts ordained and established by the Judiciary Act of 1789,
which has been the basis of the Federal jurisdiction and judica-
ture for more than a century, were the Circuit Court and the
District Court, both of which had equitable powers. Henceforth
they will be exercised by the District Court, which succeeds the
Circuit Court, as a court of general jurisdiction both in Law and
Equity. When the Circuit Court of Appeals was ordained and
established in 1891, by act of Congress under the "Inferior
Courts" clause of the Constitution, it was given the same measure
of Equity Jurisdiction by appeal as the Circuit Courts had under
the original Judiciary Act (4). In speaking, therefore, of the
Equity Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, reference is made to
that to be exercised by the District Courts of the United States
under the Act of 1911. Be it further remembered that these
courts are also courts of general law jurisdiction; and that thus
they are courts of Law and Equity in the fullest comprehension.
But it must not be supposed that they hear cases of mingled
law and equity, and by the same pleading and procedure, as occurs
in the courts of the Code States, wherein all distinctions are
abolished between actions at Law and suits in Equity. To the con-
trary, the Federal courts keep entirely separate actions at Law
and suits in Equity, as much so as did the Court of Common
Pleas and the High Court of Chancery in England a hundred
years ago. This is effected by the device of having two sides to
the Court-the Law side, and the Equity side; and between them
I IGibson, Suits in Chancery § 29.
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there is no possible connection. Whoever enters on the Law side
must remain there; he cannot cross the wall of division and sue
for equitable relief. If he wants or needs equitable relief he
must depart from the court on its law side, and enter it by the
equity door on the other side, where he will be heard by the same
Judge acting as Chancellor. Pleadings, process and procedure are
all on the chancery model, which is almost a copy of that found in
the old English High Court of Chancery; and the practice is
prescribed by a code of Equity Rules promulgated by the Su-
preme Court of the United States, by which it was specially
ordered that where not otherwise provided by rule or law, the
Circuit Court should follow the practice of the High Court of
Chancery in England. And thus we have on the equity side of
the Courts of the United States an American High Court of
Chancery.
The constitutional recognition of Law and Equity, as a common
heritage of jurisprudence by American Anglo-Saxons, the early
judicial interpretation of this constitutional phrase as a distinct
recognition, in the fundamental law, of the double system of
English judicature and jurisprudence, and the conservative char-
acter of the Federal judiciary, have all conspired to make and
keep Equity a part of the "Common Law of America" by Anglo-
Saxon inheritance, and to preserve in this Court, on its Equity
side, an American counterpart of the English High Court of
Chancery in jurisprudence, tradition, procedure and jurisdiction.
Section 16, of the great "Judiciary Act" of 1789, gave legislative
expression to the popular and professional will of the period, in a
phraseology keenly manifesting the general idea, then prevalent
in England and America, as to the boundary line of Equity Juris-
diction: "Suits in Equity shall not be sustained in either of the
Courts of the United States in any case where a plain, adequate
and complete remedy may be had at law." And this is perma-
nently imbedded in Federal law in section 723 of the Revised
Statutes. Obviously, therefore, we have here a permanent limita-
tion on the Equity Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts. And this
is rendered immovable by the judicial application of these statu-
tory words to the conditions existing at the passage of the ju-
diciary Act. This fixes the jurisprudence and practice of the
Common Law Courts in 1789 as the boundary line of Equity
I West. v. Paige, 9 N. J. Eq., 203 (1852).
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jurisdiction for all time, until or unless it is changed by Act of
Congress. So much for the Federal Courts. Now for the States
of this class:
The States that preserve, as do the United States, in a single
court the distinctions between Common Law and Equity by re-
tention of old remedies and procedure on separate sides and
dockets thereof, and thus, in full or large measure, the Equity
Jurisdiction are Florida, Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, Mary-
land, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Hampshire, Oregon, Penn-
sylvania, Rhode Island, Virginia and West Virginia. It would be
interesting to note in each State the causes of this peculiar method
of judicature, as indeed would be the same historical study in
States of the other classes. In every case it is a lesson in juris-
prudence. But the subject is too large for this article, and it
must suffice to say in a general way that it has existed in nearly
all of them from their beginnings, and in some, as in Iowa, Ken-
tucky and Oregon, has survived even the adoption of the Re-
formed Procedure. Probably in all States of this class the system
owes its origin and continuance to conformity to the Federal sys-
tem. It is important, however, to note that in few States only has
the line of jurisdiction been maintained as rigorously as in the
Federal Courts, and in some it is shadowy, indistinct, and at
places far removed from the ancient boundaries. Indeed, the
location of the jurisdiction line in the several States of this class.
requires close acquaintance with their respective statutes and
decisions. A general view of each will suffice for our present
purpose, and will serve to exhibit in this class the utter confusion
of Law and Equity in the American Courts in the "Code States,"
as well as the "Common Law States."
Florida.-By constitution and statute "Circuit Courts have
original jurisdiction in all cases of Equity."' They have likewise
jurisdiction in all actions at law. In another section of its consti-
tution, Florida shook off its Spanish inheritance of the Civil
Law, and allied herself thoroughly with the English colonies by
providing that the courts should, in all cases, not governed by
statute, decide in accordance with the Common Law. In the ab-
sence of statutory definition and direction, therefore, the courts
have followed the general lines of jurisdiction as maintained in
the Federal Courts with few local variations.
I Const. Art. NT1, § S.
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Illinois.-In Illinois by constitution "the Circuit Courts have
jurisdiction in all causes in Law and Equity."2 And by the Re-
vised Statutes it is provided that all courts having "jurisdiction
as courts of Chancery, shall have power to proceed therein ac-
cording to the mode herein provided; and, when no provision is
made by this Act, according to the general usage and practice of
Courts of Equity."' Under these provisions of law has developed
in Illinois a double system of jurisprudence and jurisdiction
closely resembling the Federal system, and the lines of Equity
Jurisdiction are practically identical with those established in the
High Court of Chancery.
Iowa.-This State, by code, early adopted the Reformed Pro-
cedure abolishing forms of action and substituting therefor a
proceeding by civil action. But the same code singularly pro-
vided for two kinds of proceeding by civil action, viz: "ordi-
nary" and "equitable," and then enacted as follows: "Plaintiff
may prosecute his action by equitable proceedings in all cases,
where courts of Equity, before the adoption of this code, had
jurisdiction, and nust so proceed in all cases where such juris-
diction was exclusive."'  This operates to require two sides or
dockets in the courts, and to fix the line of Equity Jurisdiction
where it is fixed in the Federal Courts, and to give the State
courts power to hear and determine according to principles of
Equity Jurisprudence, all cases wherein there was not a clear,
adequate and unembarrassed remedy at Law.
Kentucky.-The same peculiarity of Equity Jurisdiction ap-
pears in Kentucky as in Iowa. There is a constitutional recogni-
tion of Law and Equity, a Code of Reformed Procedure, a single
court and a siigle civil action, divided, however, into two classes,
ordinary and equitable, with different rules of proceeding (not
pleading) for each. The primary distinction is thus expressed in
the statute: "Actions of which Courts of Chancery had juris-
diction before the first of August, 1851, may be equitable, and
actions of which such jurisdiction was exclusive must be equit-
able." 5 But cases may be transferred for cause from the equity
docket to the ordinary docket or vice versa.
2 Const. Art. VI, § 12.
3 Hurd's Rev. Stat. (1889) Ch. 22, § i.
4 Code (873) § 2508.
5Carroll's Code (19o6) §6, Sec. i.
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Maine.-Equity Jurisdiction is conferred by statutes enumerat-
ing the cases in which "the Supreme judicial Court," the court
of general jurisdiction, shall have jurisdiction in Equity. The
subjects embraced in all these statutes make a long list, including
Trusts, Frauds, Accidents, Mistakes, Mortgages, Forfeitures and
Penalties, Specific Performance, Cancellation, Reformation, and
Injunction, Partnership, Accounting and Creditors' suits,' and
"in all other cases where there is not a plain, adequate and com-
plete remedy at Law." Thus the Equity Jurisdiction here is the
same as that exercised in the Federal Courts, plus that given by
statute in other special cases.
Mfaryland.--In Maryland it is enacted that the Circuit Courts,
which have original jurisdiction of law-suits, "shall have and ex-
ercise all the power, authority and jurisdiction, which the Court
of Chancery formerly held and exercised, except in so far as the
same may be modified by this code."' These modifications were
insignificant, and the lines of jurisdiction are practically the same
as the Federal lines.
Massachusetts.-If one should consult the statutes and judicial
decisions of Massachusetts prior to 1877 upon the subject of
Equity Jurisdiction he would be amazed at the narrowness of
legislation and interpretation on such a liberal and elastic subject.
But the Act of 1877 seems to indicate an entire change in legis-
lative intention, which the courts could not misunderstand: "The
Supreme Judicial Court shall have jurisdiction in equity in all
cases and matters of equity, cognizable under the general prin-
ciples of Equity Jurisprudence, and, in respect of all such cases
and matters, shall be a court of general Equity Jurisdiction." 9
More appropriate words could hardly be found to express the
legislative intention to give to this court the full measure of
Equity Jurisdiction formerly exercisedby the High Court of
Chancery, concurrent as well as exclusive. And this intention has
been appreciated and enforced by the Supreme Court in many
cases.' °
Mlichiga.-This is one of very few States, which in the mat-
ter of Equity Jurisdiction has left nothing to inference or im-
0 Rev. Stat. (1871) Ch. 77, §5.
7Laws 1874, Ch. 175, p. 126.
8 Pub. Gen. Law (i888), Art. 16, § 70.
9 Laws 1877, Ch. 178, § 2.
10 Niles v. Graham, i81 Mass. 48.
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plication, but has plainly expressed in written law the measure
of such jurisdiction: "The powers and jurisdiction of the Cir-
cuit Courts in Chancery in and for their respective counties, shall
be co-extensive with the powers and jurisdiction of the Court of
Chancery in England, with the exceptions, additions and limita-
tions created and imposed by the constitution and laws of this
State."1 With such comprehensive Equity Jurisdiction conferred
by statute the precedents of the English and Federal Courts must
aid materially in marking the line of boundary between Law and
Equity.
New Hampshire.-Equity Jurisdiction in New Hampshire is
conferred upon the "Supreme Court" (which is the style of its
court of general jurisdiction) by a statute enumerating the classes
of cases in which it shall have the powers of a court of Equity.
This enumeration includes the general heads of Trusts, Fraud,
Accident and Mistake; co-Partners and co-Owners; Mortgages
and Dower; Waste and Nuisance; Contribution, Injunction,
Specific Performance, and Discovery; and concludes, "and all
other cases where there is not a plain, adequate and complete
remedy at Law."'2 This statute has received liberal and illuminat-
ing interpretation in the courts; and thus practically the Equity
Jurisdiction in this State is substantially identical with that of
the Federal Courts.
3
O'regom.-Here again is a State with a Code of Civil "Procedure
abolishing all forms of action at Law, which retains the distinc-
tion between actions at Law and suits in Equity; and to a fuller
-measure, even than some States retaining the Common Law pro-
cedure, in that the Equity Jurisdiction includes not only the Ex-
-clusive, but also the Concurrent Jurisdiction. The statute con-
f erring this is in the following words: "The enforcement or pro-
tection of a private right, or the prevention or redress of an injury
thereto, shall be obtained by a suit in Equity in all cases where
there is not a plain, adequate and complete remedy at Law; and
-may be obtained thereby in all cases where courts of Equity have
been used to exercise concurrent jurisdiction with courts of Law,
-unless otherwise specially provided in this chapter."4 This is more
comprehensive than the Federal judiciary Act, and for measure
'Howell's Stat. § 66i.
2 Gen. Stats. (1867) Ch. i9o, § i.
3Craft v. Thompson, 51 N. H. 536-42.
4 Code Civ. Proc. § 376.
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of jurisdiction remits us to the rules of the High Court of
Chancery.
Pennsvlvania.-Equity Jurisdiction in the Keystone State is
unique and peculiar. Originally no Chancery Court was estab-
lished and no Equity Jurisdiction, worth mention, was conferred
upon the Law Courts. These courts, moved by the same con-
sideration, and motives as the early English Chancellors, assumed
Equity Jurisdiction and exercised it in law-suits to prevent
palpable injustice.' After a half century of delay, the legislative
purpose expanded, and Equity Jurisdiction was gradually con-
ferred by piecemeal, until in 1857 the domain of Equity was
nearly covered by general statutes of jurisdiction.' But this statu-
tory jurisdiction did not abridge or abolish the jurisdiction
hitherto assumed by the Law Courts, and administered through
Common Law forms.- In Pennsylvania, therefore, there exists a
double system of Equity, viz: (i) The jurisdiction assumed by
the law courts in law suits to grant equitable relief, where the
Law was powerless; (2) Jurisdiction conferred by statute upon
the same courts to administer Equity, by appropriate procedure.
This is "confusion worse confounded."
Rhode Island.-The Chancery powers conferfed on the Su-
preme Court by statute enacted in pursuance of express constitu-
tional grants are thus liberally formulated: "Exclusive cognizance
and jurisdiction of all suits and proceedings whatsoever in equity
with full power to make and enforce all orders and decrees there-
in and to issue all process therefor according to the course of
Equity."9 A court thus specially endowed should have no hesita-
tion in exercising plenary powers in Equity.
Virginia.-The Old Dominion confers Equity jurisdiction in
the following terse and total terms: "The Circuit Court of each
County shall have jurisdiction in all cases in Chancery and all
actions at Law." ' This completely covers the domains both of
Law and Equity, and obviously refers to English standards for
location of boundaries.
• i Porn. Eq. Jur. § 34o.
G IH Select Essays in Anglo-Am. Hist. 823.
7 Church v. Ruland, 64 Pa. 432.
s Const. Art. VI, § 2.
Pub. Stat. (1882) Ch. 192, § 8.
'0 Code (1887), §3058.
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Vest Virginia.-Equally terse and comprehensive is the con-
stitutional formula granting powers in West Virginia: "Circuit
Courts shall have original and general jurisdiction of all matters
at.Law, and of all cases in Equity."" Here, too, the courts on
their Equity side have the fullest measure of jurisdiction.
CODE STATES.-The subject of Equity jurisdiction has no prac-
tical interest in the States and provinces which have adopted the
full Code of Reformed Procedure, whereby every action is actu-
ally made an action in Law and Equity, brought and pursued
by Law and Equity systems in every civil case and court. The
most of these codes, though not identical in form or effect upon
Equity Jurisprudence, are uniform in abolishing not only the
separate Courts of Law and Equity and the Law and Equity
sides of the courts, but also the distinction between suits at Law
and in Equity in the same court, and in thus obviating the neces-
sity of inquiring or considering in what court or by what process
the suit shall be brought, or what form of pleadings shall be em-
ployed. In such complete Code States it is not possible to go
wrong in the matter of jurisdiction. There is but one house and
one door for all plaintiffs and complainants to enter, only one re-
ception room, and one course of treatment. It may be all Law or
all Equity, or both commingled in form and substance; the court
has power to hear and determine the controversy, and execute its
judgment or decree and no question arises as to Equity. The
States using this system of procedure are those not heretofore
mentioned, and need no further notice than the caution that
Equity, as a system of jurisprudence, has not failed, but has
rather prevailed in them; for, generally, whenever there is a
conflict between Law and Equity, the doctrines and maxims of
the latter are dominant in all civil controversies in all their courts.
It must not, however, be forgotten that some of the Code States
have not abolished all distinctions between actions at Law and
suits in Equity, but have been content to abolish all forms of
action at Law, and to substitute a single civil action in all law
cases. They have retained the old distinction between actions at
Law and suits in Equity, and have generally named them "ordi-
nary" and "equitable" suits or actions, in some cases permitting
and in others requiring equitable suits to be brought and con-
ducted according to Chancery Practice, and keeping separate Law
11 Const. Art. TIII, § 12.
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and Equity dockets, as is done in the Federal Courts. In such
Code States Equity Jurisdiction is still a live subject, and has been
treated in a previous section in the paragraphs relating to Iowa,
Kehtucky, and Oregon.
Only the expert lawyer in each State can fully appreciate the
practical extent of Chancery Jurisdiction and Procedure therein.
But enough has been detailed to show the abounding variety of
jurisdiction and proceeding, even in States of the same class;
and to assure teachers and students, authors and publishers, that
the fusion of Law and Equity is not in sight in America. Wheth-
er the existing confusion is permanent, time alone can determine.
Henry H. Ingersoll.
